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We report an outbreak of 235 community-acquired
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infec-
tions among military recruits. In this unique environment,
the close contact between recruits and the physical
demands of training may have contributed to the spread of
MRSA. Control measures included improved hygiene and
aggressive clinical treatment. 
M
ethicillin-resistant  Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
was first recognized in the 1960s and has since
become a well-known cause of nosocomial infections (1).
Recently, MRSA has been reported with increasing fre-
quency outside healthcare settings (2–5). Community-
acquired outbreaks have been reported in a variety of
populations, including prison inmates (3,4), players of
contact sports (6,7), children in daycare (8), and
crewmembers of a naval ship (9). These groups do not pos-
sess the risk factors traditionally associated with MRSA
infection, namely, recent hospitalization, dialysis, resi-
dence in a long-term care facility, or intravenous drug use
(1,2). We report an outbreak of community-acquired
MRSA infections among recruits at a large military train-
ing facility in the southeastern United States. 
The Study
The training facility where the outbreak occurred had a
recruit population that fluctuated from 3,500 to 7,000. A
case-patient was defined as a recruit with a clinically rec-
ognized skin or soft-tissue infection and a positive MRSA
culture from the site of infection. Laboratory records
showed that from October 2000 to July 2002, 47 culture-
confirmed MRSA infections occurred among recruits
(Figure 1). During this period, the monthly incidence of
MRSA did not exceed two cases per 1,000 recruits
(Figure 2). However, from August to December 2002, 235
MRSA cases occurred. During the outbreak period, the
monthly incidence rates ranged from 4.9 to 11 cases per
1,000 recruits.  
Of the case-patients, 209 (89%) were men. This per-
centage paralleled the overall male recruit population in
2002 (88% male). Although information on the specific
age of infected recruits was not available, all recruits at
this facility were 17–25 years of age. Most infections
occurred on an extremity (73.7%), most commonly the
lower leg (16.0%) and the knee (13.9%) (Table). 
To investigate what aspects of training might be associ-
ated with transmission, cases were sorted by week of train-
ing when illness was diagnosed (Figure 3). Data on
training week was available for 143 (61%) of the outbreak
patients. The rise in cases during weeks 1–5 suggests that
transmission increased with time in training. Of the cases,
86% occurred during weeks 6 to 12 but did not seem to be
associated with any single event. Moderate increases
occurred during weeks 6 and 7 (rifle range training) and
week 11, which included the “crucible,” a 54-hour strenu-
ous field exercise and final test before graduation. These
weeks include important milestones for recruits, and some
may have delayed seeking medical care until after com-
pleting these steps. 
Medical records from 20 patients were randomly
selected and reviewed during the investigation. These
patients included 18 men and 2 women, 17–24 years of
age. The diagnoses included abscesses (15 patients), cel-
lulitis (2 patients), and folliculitis (3 patients). The antimi-
crobial agents most commonly prescribed for initial
treatment were dicloxacillin (6), levofloxacin (5), and
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Figure 1. Methicilin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus cases in
recruits.ciprofloxacin (4). No patients had a history of hospitaliza-
tion within the previous year, although one patient had
been treated with levofloxacin for pneumonia 2 weeks
before. 
Nasal screening was conducted to identify carriers and
determine the colonization rate among staff members per-
manently assigned to the training facility. Anterior nasal
swabs were obtained from 874 workers who had direct
contact with recruits, including medical, dental, and labo-
ratory personnel, drill instructors, barbers, and other ancil-
lary staff. Of these, 24 (2.7%) were colonized with MRSA.
Through interviews with healthcare providers, labora-
tory personnel, and recruits, investigators found that most
patients did not display established risk factors for MRSA
(history of chronic medical conditions, hospitalization or
surgery within the previous year, history of drug use, or
recent use of an antimicrobial agent). Also, the MRSAiso-
lates were sensitive to many commonly used outpatient
antimicrobial agents, including trimethoprim/sulfamethox-
azole and clindamycin. 
No recent lapses in recruit hygiene training or practices
had occurred. Recruits were afforded daily time for shower-
ing, cleaning, and personal hygiene. However, this time was
limited, perhaps leading to deficient hygiene practices
among some recruits (i.e., inadequate showering, infrequent
handwashing, sharing towels and other personal items). 
In November 2002, facility personnel implemented an
array of control measures with an emphasis on improving
hygiene and treatment regimens. Based on existing recom-
mendations for preventing MRSA transmission in health-
care settings (10), antibacterial soaps and hand sanitizers
were placed at all recruit sinks, and investigators recom-
mended that hand washing be conducted as frequently as
possible. All recruits were issued personal bottles of anti-
bacterial hand sanitizer for use when soap and water were
not readily available. Daily showers of adequate duration
were enforced, and sharing personal items such as towels
and razors was prohibited. 
In addition, local healthcare providers were alerted to
the presence of MRSA among recruits. Culturing of
lesions was encouraged. Patients were treated with the fol-
lowing regimen aimed at eliminating both MRSAinfection
and nasal carriage: oral rifampin and minocycline for 10 to
14 days, nasal mupirocin twice daily for 10 days, and
Hibiclens washes. (Trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole could
be substituted for minocycline.) Finally, preventive medi-
cine staff conducted biweekly surveillance for MRSA
cases by using laboratory records. 
The outbreak ended in December 2002, shortly after
interventions were implemented. The actual number of
cases as well as the incidence (cases per 1,000 recruits)
declined by more than half in December 2002 and
decreased further in January and February 2003 (Figures
1 and  2). 
Conclusions
This large outbreak demonstrates the threat of MRSAin
a close-contact environment such as recruit training. Our
findings are consistent with community-acquired, rather
than nosocomial, MRSA infection (1–3,6). MRSA is
spread by direct contact, most often through the hands of
an infected or nasally colonized person (3). Several recent
community-acquired MRSA outbreaks have involved
comparable close-contact environments (3,8,9). Spread of
community-acquired MRSA has also been associated with
prolonged physical contact between sports participants
(6,7). Activities such as hand-to-hand combat training,
life-saving, and team skill-building exercises involve sim-
ilar physical contact between recruits.
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Table. Anatomic site of MRSA infection  
Site
b      No. patients                      (%) 
Lower extremity  86  (44.3) 
Thigh/hip  15  (7.7) 
Knee  27  (13.9) 
Leg  31  (16.0) 
Ankle  2  (1.0) 
Foot  11  (5.7) 
Upper extremity  57  (29.4) 
Axilla  8  (4.1) 
Arm  20  (10.3) 
Elbow  13  (6.7) 
Forearm  7  (3.6) 
Hand  9  4.6 
Head  4  (2.1) 
Face  4  (2.1) 
Neck  3  (1.5) 
Torso  3  (1.5) 
Back  9  (4.6) 
Buttocks  12  (6.2) 
Inguinal  1  (0.5) 
Genital  4  (2.1) 
Urine  1  (0.5) 
Sputum  1  (0.5) 
Tissue, unspecified  9  (4.6) 
aMRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus. 
bSite unknown for 41 patients. 
 
Figure 2. Methicilin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) inci-
dence.The physical nature of recruit training is another factor
that may have contributed to this outbreak. Recruits often
have minor cuts or abrasions that increase the risk of
developing skin infections. Such injuries would be expect-
ed during physically demanding activities such as running,
hiking, and negotiating obstacle courses. Indeed, most
MRSA infections occurred on exposed surfaces such as
arms, legs, and knees. 
The growth and transmission of methicillin-sensitive S.
aureus (MSSA), and accordingly MRSA, are increased in
humid environments (11). The number of cases increased
during warmer months, a time when recruits have more
exposed skin surfaces. This may increase their risk for
superficial wounds as well as contact with other recruit’s
skin surfaces. Furthermore, some recruits reported that their
infections started as insect bites, also a seasonal problem.
The outbreak was unlikely to have originated from a
single source. Cases occurred throughout the facility and
were not localized to recruits who had contact with a par-
ticular instructor or other staff member. Further, the per-
centage of staff members at the facility who were found to
be carriers was small and consistent with the 2%–3%
MRSA carriage rates found in recent studies (9,12,13).
Although how much contact these carriers routinely had
with recruits is unclear, this small number of patients was
not likely a major factor in spreading MRSA across so
many different groups of recruits. In fact, the growing
prevalence of MRSA in the general population (1,2,12,14)
is an important concern because recruits may enter the mil-
itary already colonized.  
Maintaining good hygiene and avoiding contact with
open skin lesions are the primary means to prevent the
spread of MRSA infections (3,7). Although no recent
changes in recruit hygiene had occurred that were directly
responsible for the outbreak, the hygiene deficiencies
noted in some recruits combined with the increased preva-
lence of MRSA were important contributing factors.
Control measures were instituted to improve hygiene,
including frequent hand washing and the use of antibacter-
ial hand sanitizers. Similar measures have been imple-
mented to control MRSAoutbreaks in comparable settings
(3,6,7,15).
Before August 2002, healthcare providers did not rou-
tinely obtain bacterial identification and sensitivities on
skin infections, possibly delaying effective treatment in
some cases. Once aware that MRSA was prevalent among
recruits, healthcare providers improved treatment by cul-
turing skin lesions whenever possible and prescribing
appropriate antimicrobial agents for MRSA infections.
Thus, the primary interventions used were recommending
improved hygiene practices for recruits and implementing
aggressive clinical protocols. These control measures,
along with the onset of cooler weather, likely played
important roles in ending the outbreak. 
This outbreak occurred in a previously healthy military
training population and was associated with close contact,
limited opportunity for practicing good personal hygiene,
warm weather, and physical stress. Reducing MRSAinfec-
tions was related to implementing interventions to improve
personal hygiene, aggressive evaluation and treatment of
people with soft tissue injuries and infections, and cooler
weather.
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Conference Presentations
Online and on CD-ROM
Webcasts–some enhanced by the visual 
presentations– of the International Conference 
on Women and Infectious Diseases (February 27 -
28, 2004) and the International Conference on
Emerging Infectious Diseases (February 29 -
March 3, 2004) are now available.
Online access to the presentations is available to
conference attendees. A username and password
are required, previously emailed to all registrants.
The online sessions are accessible for a limited
time only.
Conference presentations are also available on
CD-ROM, which includes audio for selected ses-
sions and visual elements for all sessions. A CD-
ROM may be purchased for ICWID (US $99.00
plus shipping) and for ICEID (US $129.00 plus
shipping) from Conference Archives. Call 1-866-
316-3289 or 1-814-536-3356 (outside the United
States) to purchase. Additional information is
available at www.conferencearchives.com/icwid 
and www.conferencearchives.com/iceid
All material published in Emerging Infectious Diseases is in the
public domain and may be used and reprinted without special per-
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